IPv6 Source Guard

IPv6 Source Guard is one of the IPv6 FHS (First Hop Security) features. It filters inbound traffic on L2 switch ports that are not in the IPv6 binding table. The binding table stores the following information:

  • IPv6 address
  • MAC address
  • VLAN
  • Interface ID

Source Guard only looks at information found in the binding table, and it doesn’t fill the binding table. You need another feature like ND inspection or IPv6 snooping to do this. You can fill the binding table with information from:

When source guard denies traffic because it is not found in the binding table, it notifies the IPv6 address glean feature. This feature can query a DHCP server or uses IPv6 ND (Neighbor Discovery) to find the missing information, if possible.

Configuration

In this lesson, we will take a look at Source Guard in action. This is the topology I use:

Ipv6 Source Guard Lab Topology

Let me explain this topology:

  • H1 is a legitimate host and receives an IPv6 address through DHCP.
  • H2 is an attacker that tries to perform a DoS attack on S1.
  • R1 is our DHCP server.
  • S1 is a server that is under attack by H2.
  • SW1 is where we configure IPv6 Source Guard.




Configurations

Want to take a look for yourself? Here you will find the startup configuration of each device.

H1

hostname H1
!
interface FastEthernet0/0
 ipv6 address dhcp
 ipv6 enable
!
end

R1

hostname R1
!
ipv6 unicast-routing
ipv6 cef
ipv6 dhcp pool MY_POOL
 address prefix 2001:DB8:0:12::/64
!
interface FastEthernet0/0
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:0:12::F/64
 ipv6 dhcp server MY_POOL
!
end

S1

hostname S1
!
ipv6 unicast-routing
ipv6 cef
!
interface FastEthernet0/0
 ipv6 address 2001:DB8:0:4::4/64
!
ipv6 route ::/0 2001:DB8:0:4::F
!
end

Without Source Guard

Let’s get started. In our first scenario, I will show you how H2 can attack S1 when we don’t use Source Guard.

Let’s check if R1 has assigned an IPv6 address through DHCP to H1:

R1#show ipv6 dhcp binding 
Client: FE80::217:5AFF:FEED:7AF0 
  DUID: 0003000100175AED7AF0
  Username : unassigned
  IA NA: IA ID 0x00030001, T1 43200, T2 69120
    Address: 2001:DB8:0:12:FC57:49F8:6AA5:1448
            preferred lifetime 86400, valid lifetime 172800
            expires at Aug 08 2018 01:45 PM (172342 seconds)
H1#show ipv6 interface brief | include 2001
    2001:DB8:0:12:FC57:49F8:6AA5:1448

We verify that H1 has an IPv6 address. Let’s make sure it can reach S1:

H1#ping 2001:DB8:0:4::4                    
Type escape sequence to abort.
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 2001:DB8:0:4::4, timeout is 2 seconds:
!!!!!
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 0/0/0 ms

Let’s take a look at S1:

S1#show ipv6 neighbors 
IPv6 Address                              Age Link-layer Addr State Interface
FE80::21D:A1FF:FE8B:36D1                    6 001d.a18b.36d1  STALE Fa0/0
2001:DB8:0:4::F                             6 001d.a18b.36d1  STALE Fa0/0

S1 knows two neighbors with the same MAC address. Both addresses belong to R1.

Let’s see how we can attack S1 from H2. On H2, I enable IPv6 so that I get a link-local address and so that H2 knows how to get to other subnets through R1. I also configure a couple of fake IPv6 addresses that belong to the 2001:DB8:0:4::/64 subnet:

H2(config)#interface FastEthernet 0/0
H2(config-if)#ipv6 enable
H2(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:DB8:0:4::100/128
H2(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:DB8:0:4::101/128
H2(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:DB8:0:4::102/128
H2(config-if)#ipv6 address 2001:DB8:0:4::103/128

Let’s send a couple of pings from H2 to S1 from each fake IPv6 address:

H2#ping 2001:DB8:0:4::4 source 2001:DB8:0:4::100 timeout 0 repeat 1
H2#ping 2001:DB8:0:4::4 source 2001:DB8:0:4::101 timeout 0 repeat 1
H2#ping 2001:DB8:0:4::4 source 2001:DB8:0:4::102 timeout 0 repeat 1
H2#ping 2001:DB8:0:4::4 source 2001:DB8:0:4::103 timeout 0 repeat 1

You have to be quick but when you look at the IPv6 neighbors of S1, you see these entries:

S1#show ipv6 neighbors 
IPv6 Address                              Age Link-layer Addr State Interface
FE80::21D:A1FF:FE8B:36D1                    0 001d.a18b.36d1  REACH Fa0/0
2001:DB8:0:4::F                             3 001d.a18b.36d1  STALE Fa0/0
2001:DB8:0:4::101                           0 -               INCMP Fa0/0
2001:DB8:0:4::100                           0 -               INCMP Fa0/0
2001:DB8:0:4::102                           0 -               INCMP Fa0/0
2001:DB8:0:4::103                           0 -               INCMP Fa0/0

S1 wants to know the MAC addresses of these IPv6 addresses but since nobody on the 2001:DB8:0:4::/64 subnet answers, it never gets a reply.

When S1 does not get a reply it deletes the entry in a few seconds. My four pings won’t do any harm but a script that generates random IPv6 addresses non-stop will.

With Source Guard

Let’s see if we can put a stop to this. Before I can play with Source Guard, I need to have a binding table with some entries. A quick way to do this is to enable IPv6 snooping.

IPv6 Snooping

IPv6 snooping tracks DHCP and ND packets so it’s a nice way to get entries in our binding table. Let’s create a snooping policy:

SW1(config)#ipv6 snooping policy SNOOPING
SW1(config-ipv6-snooping)#security-level glean

I change the security level to glean because I only want to use snooping to get information into the binding table. If you don’t change the policy, IPv6 snooping will also activate RA guard.

Let’s activate the snooping policy on all interfaces:

SW1(config)#interface range GigabitEthernet 0/1 - 3
SW1(config-if-range)#ipv6 snooping attach-policy SNOOPING

Let’s clear the IPv6 address on H1 so that IPv6 snooping can see the DHCP packets:

H1#clear ipv6 dhcp client FastEthernet 0/0

SW1 now has some entries in the binding table:

SW1#show ipv6 neighbors binding 
Binding Table has 3 entries, 3 dynamic 
Codes: L - Local, S - Static, ND - Neighbor Discovery, DH - DHCP, PKT - Other Packet, API - API created
Preflevel flags (prlvl):
0001:MAC and LLA match     0002:Orig trunk            0004:Orig access           
0008:Orig trusted trunk    0010:Orig trusted access   0020:DHCP assigned         
0040:Cga authenticated     0080:Cert authenticated    0100:Statically assigned   


    IPv6 address                            Link-Layer addr Interface vlan prlvl  age   state    Time left
ND  FE80::21D:A1FF:FE8B:36D0                001D.A18B.36D0  Gi0/1        1  0005    1s  REACHABLE  311 s            
ND  FE80::217:5AFF:FEED:7AF0                0017.5AED.7AF0  Gi0/2        1  0005    1s  REACHABLE  304 s            
DH  2001:DB8:0:12:20A8:D970:FA26:4403       0017.5AED.7AF0  Gi0/2        1  0024    7s  REACHABLE  298 s(164185 s)

We see two neighbor discovery entries and one DHCP entry. We now have everything we need to test Source Guard.

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Forum Replies

  1. Not sure if the forum is the spot for this. I am only able to view the “preview version” of the video for this section (1:25 run time). I can view the “full” version of everything else (made sure I was logged in, etc.), so I am thinking maybe the wrong video is up in the “members” version of the page?

  2. Hello Nicholas

    Thanks for letting us know. I will let Rene know so he can take a look ASAP and resolve the issue.

    Laz

  3. Hello Nicholas,

    You are right, I accidentally had the trial video for non-members. Just fixed it, you can see the whole video now. Thanks for letting us know!

    Rene

  4. Hi

    What is the difference between Ipv6 source guard and ipv6 destination guard ?

    Thanks

  5. Hello Giovanni

    IPv6 source guard is a layer 2 snooping feature that blocks any traffic from an unknown source. An unknown source is an IPv6 address that is not already in the binding table or has not previously been learned through ND, as described in the lesson.

    IPv6 destination guard will ensure that a device performs address resolution only for those addresses that are known to be active on the link. It uses what is known as address glean functionality. Address gleaning involves snooping Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) and DHCP messages on the link to p

    ... Continue reading in our forum

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